Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law
Volume 19
Issue 2 Spring 1986

Article 3

1986

Human Rights in Africa: Observations on the Implications of
Economic Priority
Minasse Haile

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Human Rights Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Minasse Haile, Human Rights in Africa: Observations on the Implications of Economic Priority, 19
Vanderbilt Law Review 299 (2021)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl/vol19/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For
more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: OBSERVATIONS ON
THE IMPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC PRIORITY
Minasse Haile*
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.

II.

III.

INTRODUCTION ......................................
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS ........................

299

A.
B.

302

The "Economic Rights First" Approach .....
The "Civil and Political Rights First" Approach ....................................

IMPLICATIONS FOR AFRICANS OF ASSIGNING PRIORITY
TO ECONOMIC RIGHTS: THE PROBLEMS OF DEVELOPMENT IN THE ABSENCE OF CIVIL AND POLITICAL
RIGHTS ............................................

A.
B.
C.

The Problem to be Addressed ..............
Causes of the Crisis in African Agriculture...
Explanation of the Causes for the Failure to
Raise Agricultural Production ...............

IV. THE DILEMMA AND SOLUTIONS .....................

A.
B.
C.
D.
V.

Revolution ................................
Supporting Pragmatic Authoritarian Regimes
Participation ..............................
Nationalization ............................

CONCLUSION .......................................
I.

302

308

313

313
314
316
323

323
326
327
327
328

INTRODUCTION

International human rights generally are grouped into three
broad categories: civil and political rights, economic rights and
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personal security rights.' Little disagreement exists that in principle every state should observe personal security rights regardless
of the State's economic and political system and the level of its
development. Views diverge, however, on the relative priority that
a state should accord the implementation of civil and political
rights versus economic rights.
Many African and other Third World states which receive support from the Eastern European states argue that priority should
be given to implementing economic rights rather than to civil and
political rights. They contend that economic development is a
necessary precondition to the attainment of civil and political
rights. Similarly, the United Nations and its Specialized Agencies
both explicitly emphasize the importance of meeting "the basic
needs" of the poor in the developing world. Although the Specialized Agencies also emphasize "participation," they generally refer
to the involvement of local people in implementing local programs, rather than to the right of a people in a given country to
elect their principal political leaders. In contrast, many developed
Western states have emphasized the importance of civil and political rights not only as an objective worth pursuing in its own
right, but also as a necessary means for attaining a rapid economic development.
The debate over priorities has taken on added salience because
a serious economic crisis involving a decline in agricultural production has developed in Africa. In recent years, food production
per capita has actually declined in most African countries. Importation of food grains is rising. Export crop production has stagnated. Increases in per capita income have been meager at best,
and in some African countries per capita income has declined.

1. This categorization follows the approach which the United States Department of State has adopted. HousE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SEN. COMM. ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS, 97TH CONG. 2D SESS., Country Report on Human Rights

Practices, 2 (Joint. Comm. Print 1981) [hereinafter Country Report]. This Report groups the internationally recognized rights into the following three broad
categories:
first, the right to be free from governmental violations of the integrity of

the person-violations such as torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; arbitrary arrest or imprisonment; denial of fair public trial; and invasion of the home; second, the right to enjoy civil and
political liberties, including freedom of speech, press, religion and assembly; third, the right to participate in government. ...
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When the balance-of-payment crisis and the rise of external indebtedness is added to these problems, the economic picture of
Africa is grim.2
The causes of the economic crisis are many and varied.3 Among
the most important factors are the inadequate policies many African governments have pursued. Because most of the people of Africa live in rural areas, improvement of the conditions of the rural
masses through appropriate economic policies is essential to any
overall amelioration of the living conditions of all the people. The
policies of African governments with respect to the rural masses,
however, have been harmful. Farmers' access to essential services
has been very limited. In terms of the provision of essential
health services, education and access to safe water, the record of
most African governments has been one of neglect.
The strategies of choice concerning the improvement of the record of economic development in Africa have undergone changes
since World War II because, one after the other, each new strategy failed to improve the lot of the poor.4 The first strategies emphasized the growth of gross national product as the primary
means of achieving economic development. This strategy failed to
improve the conditions of the poor, and underdeveloped countries
turned to strategies emphasizing "employment" and "growth with
equity." These strategies also failed in practice to fulfill their
promises to the poor. This failure led the planners to propose the
basic needs strategy (BNS), 5 a strategy that directly addressed
satisfying the basic needs of the poor. Unfortunately, neither the
BNS nor the related agricultural strategy, Action for Rural Development, 6 which the World Bank developed seem more likely to
succeed than their predecessors.
The most recently developed strategies, the BNS and Action
for Rural Development, are based at least implicitly on the following two assumptions: (1) the political leaders of African countries are willing and able to exert themselves to the utmost in the
2. See AFRICAN STRATEGY REVIEW GROUP, ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT IN
SUB-SAHARA AFRICA: AN AGENDA FOR ACTION, 2-4 (The International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank 1981) [hereinafter ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT].

3. Id. at chs. 2-3.
4. See P. STREETEN,

FIRST THINGS

IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

5. Id. at 13.
6. ACCELERATED

Fms

MEETING THE BASIC HUMAN NEEDS

8-12 (1981).

DEVELOPMENT,

supra note 2, at ch. 5.
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interest of their respective peoples; and (2) to unleash their benevolence, the African political leaders only need the resources
and strategies that will allow them to achieve their developmental
goals. Certain fundamental constraints on the leaders of African
countries which arise primarily from leaders' interest in surviving
in power render both of these assumptions false. The same constraints also doom to failure development strategies that do not
take this political reality into account.
Thus, defective economic strategy has not led to economic crisis
in Africa. Rather, the social distance between government and the
rural poor and the absence of institutions through which farmers
can influence the formulation and execution of policies affecting
agriculture explains the policies of African governments which
have been either harmful to or neglectful of the agrarian sector.
The only way to overcome the political constraints on development in Africa may be to find means by which the rural masses
can impose their interests on their political leaders, means by
which to recognize and implement, to some degree, the African
peoples' civil and political rights.
The pervasive concern with the strategies and techniques of development, the general failure to examine the political assumptions on which those strategies are based, and the emergence of
the view that civil and political rights should not form a focus of
attention create a precarious outlook. Section II of this article examines the relationship of economic rights and civil and political
rights to economic development along with the problems involved
in establishing democratic institutions in Africa. Using the right
to food as an example, Section III describes in more detail the
extent to which economic rights depend on the recognition of civil
and political rights in the African context. Section IV examines
avenues for pursuing economic rights that account for both political and civil rights and African political realities. Section V sets
forth conclusions.
II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND

CIVIL

AND POLITICAL RIGHTS

A.

The "Economic Rights First" Approach

The idea of giving first priority to attainment of economic
rights and of consigning to an indefinite future the fulfillment of
civil and political rights is not new. The Soviet Union and other
communist countries pursue economic policies and maintain po-
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litical systems that ostensibly give priority to economic development and the satisfaction of society's basic material needs.7 Indeed, Soviet insistence led to the inclusion of economic rights in
the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. Traditionally, the
Western democracies had deemed that economic rights flow naturally from the recognition of civil and political rights.
Many African leaders have supported the general notion of according priority to economic rights. Some leaders have believed in
good faith that they could make greater headway in achieving economic plenty for their people if they could eliminate public criticism of government policy. Other African leaders preferred to
give priority to economic rights to provide themselves with a
ready made means to acquire political power or to perpetuate
their tenure in office.
Proponents of assigning priority to economic rights over civil
and political rights give several reasons to support their views.
First, they claim that more of the world's population is actually
suffering from the denial of their economic rights "to work, food,
health, shelter and education. . . than from violations from their
rights to freedom from torture, arbitrary detention and censorship of the press."" A second rationale is that a starving, illiterate
man cannot understand civil and political rights, 9 and therefore,
human rights in some cases should be set aside until the majority
of the people are educated and conditions of living are improved. 10 Third, civil and political rights are not universal concepts and have little application to the non-Western world.,, A
fourth justification involves the difficulty the developing countries
would have in achieving rapid economic development if they give

7.

See Przetacznik, The Socialist Concept of Human Rights: Its Philosophi-

cal Background and PoliticalJustification, 13 REVUE
TIONALE 267-68 (1977).

BELGE DE DROIT INTERNA-

8. P. WEIss, HUMAN RIGHTS AND VITAL NEEDS 2 (Institute for Policy Studies
1977).
9. See Statement by the Representative of Cuba to the United Nations
General Assembly, 32 U.N. GAOR c.3 (43d mtg.) at 3, U.N. DOC. A/C.3132/
SR.43 (1977).
10. See SEMINAR ON THE STUDY OF NEW WAYS AND MEANS FOR PROMOTING
HUMAN RIGHTS WITH SPECIAL ATTENTION TO THE PROBLEMS AND NEEDS OF AF-

RICA, 1973, at 9, U.N. Doc. STfrAO/HR/48 (1973) (organized by the United Na-

tions in cooperation with the Government of Tanzania, Dar-es-Salaam).
11. See Pollis & Schwab, Introductionin HUMAN RIGHTS: CULTURAL AND IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 1 (A. Polis & P. Schwab eds. 1979).
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priority to civil and political rights or if they observe those rights
simultaneously with economic rights. The basic assumption that
"the securing of civil and political rights. . . will somehow, as if
by magic, lead the Third World out of underdevelopment"' 12 is
by historical evidence."' 3 Fifth, the
wholly "unsupported ...
mass communications media and other phenomena of the modern
world stimulate expectations in the minds of the people of the
Third World that are likely to complicate the task of economic
development in states observing civil and political rights.1 4 Sixth,
the multiparty political systems inherent in the concept of civil
and political rights would tend to reflect tribal particularism in
Africa and to create unwanted opportunities for foreign influence
in African states' internal affairs. 1 5 Last, proponents of economic
rights doubt whether observance of civil and political rights in the
developing countries will lead to political and economic stability."' Because African states are new, their first priority should be
to establish strong, viable governments.'
As the concept of economic development has evolved in recent
years, a trend, as reflected in the debates in the United Nations,
has developed toward greater support of the "economic rights
first" approach and away from support of civil and political
rights. In the twenty or thirty years following World War II, the
problems of economic development were thought essentially to be
tied to the rate at which per capita gross national product (GNP)
rose in the developing countries.' The idea was that once growth
took place in a developing country, the benefits of that growth
would either trickle down naturally to the poorer segments of society or the government would redistribute the benefits of the

12. See Weiss, supra note 8, at 2.
13. Id.
14. See Statement by the Representative of Pakistanin the United Nations
General Assembly, 32 U.N. GAOR c.3 (53d mtg.) at 2, U.N. DOC. A/C.3132/
SR.53 (1977).
15. See SEMINAR ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES at 35 U.N.
DOC. STTA0]HR/25 (1966) (organized by the United Nations in cooperation
with the Government of Senegal) [hereinafter Senegal Seminar].
16. See L. PYE, ASPECTS OF POLrrICAL DEVELOPMENT 72 (1966).
17. See Linton, Human Rights and Development, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMEN. REPORT OF A SEMINAR ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THEIR PROMOTION IN
THE CARIBBEAN, 20 Int'l Comm'n of Jurists, Pamphlet Vol. 3, 20 (1978).

18. INT'L LABOUR OFFICE, EMPLOYMENT, GROWTH AND BASIC NEEDS:
WORLD PhOBLEM 1-2 (1976) [hereinafter ILO].

A

ONE-
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larger economic pie resulting from the growth in GNP. International agencies engaged in development assistance, Western aid
donors and the developing countries based their development policies largely on this notion of "grow now, trickle later."1 9
The policy of encouraging greater aggregate output resulted in
'20 "[I]t
"impressive rates of growth in many developing countries.
has become increasingly evident. . . that rapid growth at the national level does not automatically reduce poverty and inequality
or provide sufficient productive employment" 211 in the Third
World. In Africa unemployment rose 22 and inequality of income
increased,2 3 with the result that the bottom forty percent of the
population received fifteen percent of the total income, 24 and unemployment and underemployment affected as much as forty percent of the labor force. 25 This situation stimulated changes in the
concept of economic development.
First, the International Labor Organization (ILO) initiated employment oriented economic policies. This led to the adoption of
the Employment Policy Convention, which required states to pursue "as a major goal an active policy designed to promote ' 26 full
employment. Along with employment targets came the view that
the goals of economic development should be broadened to include "redistribution with growth" to assure that the fruits of
27
growth were more evenly spread among all segments of society.
When it became clear that a commitment to redistribution was
insufficient to meet the essential needs of the poor, the BNS was
introduced. In addition to economic growth, increased employment, and greater redistribution of income, the BNS emphasized

19. Wilber & Jameson, Paradigms of Economic Development and Beyond,
in DIRECTIONS IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 1, 14 (K. Jameson & C. Wilber eds.
1977).
20. ILO, supra note 18, at 4.
21. Id. at 15.
22. Id. at 17.
23. "[T]he material conditions of life for large numbers of people are worse
today than they were one or two decades ago." Id. at 23.
24. R. SANDBROOK, THE POLITICS OF BASIC NEEDS: URBAN ASPECTS OF AsSAULTING POVERTY IN AFRICA 4 (1982).
25. See ILO, supra note 18, at 18 (Table 1). In 1972, 239 million Africans
(69% of the population) were classified as "seriously poor" and 134 million
(39% of the population) as "destitute" and suffering from severe malnutrition.
Id. at 22 (Table 2).
26.

Id. at 2.

27. See Wilber & Jameson, supra note 19, at 12-18.
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the necessity of actions designed to meet the basic minimum
needs of the poor directly.2 The BNS stressed "[c]ertain minimum requirements of a family for private consumption: adequate
food, shelter and clothing, . . . [and] essential services provided
by and for the community at large, such as safe drinking water,
sanitation, public transport and health and educational
'29
facilities.
Whether the international agencies that have endorsed the
BNS believe that it requires recognition of the nonmaterial components of human rights, such as civil and political rights and
personal security rights, is not clear.3 0 For example, the ILO, in
its report advocating the BNS, only vaguely referred to "partici' 31
pation of the people in making the decisions which affect them."
The great emphasis the United Nations Special Agencies gave to
government policies directed to meeting basic material needs suggests the agencies would not accord the satisfaction of nonmaterial needs an important role in the BNS.3 2 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 32/130 of 1977, while recognizing
perfunctorily that "all human rights and fundamental freedoms
. . .are indivisible, ' 33 declared that "[t]he full realization of civil
and political rights without the enjoyment of economic, social and
cultural rights is impossible. '3 4 This resolution is an equivocal espousal of the view that economic rights should have priority over
civil and political rights.3 5

28. Trubek, Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in the Third World:
Human Rights Law and Human Needs Programs,in 1 HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 205, 227 (1984).
29. ILO, supra note 18, at 32.
30. These agencies include the World Bank, the World Health Organization,
ILO and UNESCO. See Alston, Human Rights and Basic Needs: A Critical Assessment, 12 REVUE DES DROITS DE L'HoMME 19, 23-27, 35 (1979).

31. ILO, supra note 18, at 32.
32. Civil and political rights are not included in the BNS. See Alston, supra
note 30, at 35.
33. G.A. Res. 130, 32 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 45) at 150, U.N. DOC. A/32/45
(1977).
34. Id. at 151.
35. See Moskowitz, Implementing Human Rights: Present Status and Future Prospects, in HUMAN RIGHTS: THIRTY YEARS AFTER THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION 109 (Ramcharan ed. 1979), for an analysis of the debates in the Third
Committee. "Obviously, if human rights are perceived in the spirit of the General Assembly resolution 32/130, the stress in the United Nations will be increasingly on forms of implementation designed to further economic develop-
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Thus, in the United Nations the trend in the area of development is toward greater support of the economic rights first approach and relative neglect of civil and political rights and personal security rights. The purpose of the Universal Declaration on
Human Rights -was to place before the world the human rights
and fundamental freedoms set forth in the United Nations Charter as a standard for all peoples and all nations. To the extent
that certain of those rights now are given preference over others,
a spirit of revisionism exists in the United Nations" and elsewhere. In sum, the BNS's lack of emphasis on nonmaterial rights
indicates another effort to endorse the economic rights first approach to development.
Full acceptance of the economic rights first approach presents
both serious problems of principle and practical difficulties. At
the extreme, the approach yields certain propositions which even
the strongest adherents of the economic rights first view are unlikely to accept. The following hypothetical illustrates the
problem.
First, assume that the African countries are in a position to
give priority to economic rights and that this priority leads to economic development. If the necessary by-product of this approach is a severe violation of the nonmaterial components of
human rights a society will result in which all basic material
needs are met, but in which the people have little or no role in
shaping their destiny. The question of whether a dictatorship by
one or the few over a people whose material needs are met is acceptable arises under this set of facts.
The government of South Africa defends its policy of
apartheid, particularly its denial of civil and political rights to the
black majority, largely on the grounds that the economic needs of
the blacks are being met. That policy, however, is almost universally condemned. Even the most ardent supporters of the economic rights first approach do not defend the South African regime. They are unlikely to find a similarly extreme extension of
their theory palatable in other settings.
Once the extreme position is rejected, the two real issues raised
by the economic rights first approach become relatively clear. The
first issue is whether the economic rights first approach is practical in Africa, given that continent's present political and ecoment. . .

."

Id. at 126.

36. Id. at 111.
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nomic conditions. The likely results of the implementation of that
approach are the second concern. More specifically, a consideration of the political and economic consequences of the absence of
civil and political rights is necessary. This consideration involves
questions of whether the African ruling elites are likely to assign
priority to economic rights, whether the approach is likely to lead
to economic progress if priority is assigned to economic rights,
and whether, in the long term, the assigning of priority to economic rights will leave unimpaired civil and political rights and
personal security rights.
The economic rights first approach is supportable only if these
questions are answered in the affirmative. If the answer to any of
them is in the negative, no basis would exist for the hope that an
almost exclusive emphasis on economic rights would lead to economic development. If the ruling elites will not or cannot dedicate
themselves to economic betterment of all the people, or if a purported assignment of priority to economic rights tends to do permanent injury to civil and political rights, then the economic
rights first approach should lose all credibility.37
B. The "Civil and Political Rights First" Approach
Those who feel that the developing world should either give
priority to civil and political rights or attempt to give them a status equal to that of economic rights have argued that to assume
the poor and the illiterate cannot understand human rights is unreasonable; 38 the existence of poverty and illiteracy cannot be
used to justify infringement of the rights to life and to freedom
from arbitrary arrest, torture and slavery.39 They also state that
human rights is a universal concept,40 and civil and political
37. Of course, regardless of whether a government claims to accord priority
to economic development or not, economic growth has the potential of expanding the middle class and thereby making it increasingly difficult for the
ruling elites to ignore demands for civil and political rights.
38.

See

SEMINAR ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

at 31, U.N.

DOC ST/TAO/HR21 (1964) (organized by the United Nations in cooperation
with the Government of Afghanistan).
39. See Van Boven, United Nations Policies and Strategies: Global Perspectives, in HUMAN RIGHTS: THIRTY YEARS AFTER THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION
83, 86-87 (Ramcharan ed. 1979).
40. See Berger, Are Human Rights Universal?, COMMENTARY, Sept. 1977, at
60-63. See also Manglapus, Human Rights Are Not a Western Discovery,
WORLDVIEW 4 (1978).
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rights form part of traditional African society.41 Further, this
group holds that even if the absence of civil and political rights
facilitates economic development, the former should not be sacrificed in the interest of economic development.4 2 The sacrifice of
individual liberty in the name of economic development is too
high a price to pay.4 3 This group also believes that people do not
always place material goods above civil and political rights." In
addition, economic development may not be possible in the absence of civil and political rights. 4 The experiences of Brazil,
South Korea and India demonstrate that sacrificing liberty for a
rapid economic development produces negative results.4 6 In the
absence of civil and political rights, for example, investment takes
unproductive, wasteful forms, 7 and without popular participation
in decision-making, very serious mistakes in economic policyr are

difficult to correct. 48 According to this approach, the justifications
offered for single party political systems are invalid.49 Those systems lead to personality cults and become tools by which privi50
leged minorities perpetuate inequality.

41. See All African Council of Churches/World Council of Churches, Factors
Responsible for the Violation of Human Rights in Africa, 6 Issue 44 (Winter
1976). See also Wai, Human Rights in Sub-Sahara Africa, in HUMAN RIGHTS:
CULTURAL AND IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 115 (A. Pollis & P. Schwab eds. 1979).
42. See Statement by the Representative of the United Kingdom, 32 U.N.
GAOR 3rd Comm. (54th mtg.) at 3, U.N. DOC. A/C.3/32/SR.54 (1977).
43. See Senegal Seminar, supra note 15, at 37.
44. See FREEDOM IN THE WORLD: POLITICAL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIEs 6 (R.
Gastil ed. 1978) [hereinafter Gastil].
45. See Statement by the Representative of Ireland, 32 U.N. GAOR 3rd
Comm. (68th mtg.) at 11, U.N. DOC. A/C.3/32/SR.68 (1977).
46. See MANGLAPUS, supra note 40, at 6.
47. Williams, Human Rights and Economic Development, in HUMAN RIGHTS
AND DEVELOPMENT 26 (1977).
48. See Howard, The Full-Belly Thesis: Should Economic Rights Take Priority Over Civil and Political Rights? Evidence from Sub-Sahara Africa, 5
HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY: A COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SO-

467 (1983).
49. See Lewis, Beyond African Dictatorship:The Crisis of the One-Party
State, in GOVERNING IN BLACK AFRICA. PERSPECTIVES ON NEW STATES, 83 (M.
CIAL SCIENCES, HUMANITIES, AND LAW

Duro & N. Stultz eds. 1970). See also Henderson, Underdevelopment and Political Rights: A Revisionist Challenge, 12 GOV'T AND OPPOSITION 276 (1977).

50. Senegal Seminar, supra note 15, at 36. Some commentators believe that
a minimum core of rights derived from both civil and political rights and economic rights should be observed simultaneously. See Linton, World Development, Change and the Challenge of Human Rights, 1978 NEw ZEALAND L. J.
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If civil and political rights are viable in the present African
condition, but the assignment of priority to these rights or their
equal status with economic rights fails to bring about the desired
economic progress, the result may be a society of free citizens who
go hungry and whose other material needs remain unfulfilled. The
adherents of a civil and political rights first approach are not
likely to accept this extreme statement.
Following rejection of this extreme outcome, more practical issues raised by the civil and political rights first approach to development surface. These issues include the current viability of civil
and political rights in Africa in the face of the colonial legacy, the
fragility of national unity,51 the danger of foreign subversion,52
and the rising expectations of the peoples of Africa for improved
conditions of life.5 3 Another concern is that economic progress is
doubtful in circumstances in which civil and political rights may
imply political instability. 54 Further, the possibility exists that the
people might use their civil and political rights to increase consumption rather than investment. If civil and political rights are
not viable or, if an African society cannot achieve material progress under them, little basis remains for arguing that civil and
political rights should be given priority.
Some who support giving priority to civil and political rights in
Africa tend to rely mistakenly on the perceived historical experience of the Western countries. The orthodox paradigm,55 or liberal theory,56 of development is based largely on Western historical experience. During the 1950s and 1960s, many believed this
theory was applicable to the Third World. The orthodox paradigm had much in common with the trickle down theory of economic development. This theory held that as people acted to
245-46. See also Linton, HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 17, at 2122; Colson, Introduction, in THE ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION, HUMAN RIGHTS,
HUMAN NEEDS, AND DEVELOPING NATiONS 1-4 (1980). These commentators disagree, however, about the content of the minimum core. See Schechter, The
Views of 'Charterists'and 'Skeptics' on Human Rights in the World Legal Order, 9 HOFSTRA L. REv. 357, 375-78 (1981).
51. See Haile, Human Rights, Stability, and Development in Africa: Some

Observations on Concept and Reality, 24 VA. J. INT'L L. 575, 594-595 (1984).
52., Id. at 597.
53. Id. at 595-598.
54. Id. at 603.
55.

See Wilber & Jameson, supra note 19, at 7.

56. K. Trubek, supra note 28, at 8.
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maximize their self-interests in competitive markets, higher total
income, increased mass consumption17 and, eventually, increased
civil and political freedom would result. Despite the utility of this
liberal theory of development to explain the historical Western
experience, it failed to prove viable in the Third World. Economic
growth in the Third World has not led to democracy or to equitable economic development. This failure intensified debates in the
West about the manner in which economic and political development should be secured in the Third World, a debate which included the question of whether civil and political rights should
precede or follow economic development.
The ineffectiveness of this classic liberal theory in the Third
World, and in Africa in particular, may be a result of the differences in the circumstances that existed when the West underwent
industrialization and those now prevailing in the developing
countries. For example, the liberal view of development assumes
the existence of a limited democracy or bourgeoisie democracy.
The theory takes for granted the existence of national unity,
which the West achieved prior to industrialization. This theory
did not have to concern itself with a global ideological struggle
designed to influence the minds and actions of peoples everywhere. Finally, the theory assumed the existence of propitious
conditions for political stability.
When the conditions that existed at the time the West was industrializing are contrasted with those prevailing in Africa today,
the reasons both for the failure of the automatic process of economic and political development and for the folly of giving priority to civil and political rights become clear. First, industrialization took place in the West after the bourgeoisie had achieved
predominant political power. Thus, political leaders were forced
to depend on the support of the middle class.58 To satisfy their

middle class constituency, 59 those leaders had to join with the industrialists to give high priority to economic activities. In essence,
the political structure compelled economic growth, even though
the limited nature of political participation did not lead to equitable distribution of income. Africa, by contrast, has no large
middle class, nor even limited democracy. Rather, one-man or oligarchic rule characterizes the political structure. Therefore, most
57.

See Wilber & Jameson, supra note 19, at 8.

58. A.F.K.

ORGANsI,

59. Id. at 70-78.

THE STAGES OF POLTIcAL DEVELoPmNT 65 (1965).
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African leaders face no compulsion to give priority to economic
development or to meet the basic needs of the poor. In short, Africa does not fit the model of the liberal view of development with
respect to the existence of limited democracy.
Second, limited democracy fostered the accumulation of capital
in the West. The limited democracies of the West could hold
down consumption and increase investment by outlawing labor
unions and denying welfare to the poor.6 0 Current ideals concerning development and the role of civil and political rights involve
universal suffrage, free labor unions and the provision of social
welfare. Whether an African country can achieve economic development and meet the basic needs of the poor in this ideal system
is a question that those who support the giving of priority to civil
and political rights must consider.
Third, as the West industrialized under bourgeois democracy,
the following factors assured political stability: the popular belief
in the laissez-faire doctrine,6 1 the absence of other developed
countries which could serve as models,62 the absence of destabilizing propaganda, product of global, ideological struggle of the
superpowers, and the lack of serious problems with national
unity. These factors contributed to political stability and held
popular expectations for improved conditions to a manageable
proportion. In Africa and the rest of the developing countries
these conditions do not exist. Few believe in laissez-faire, and
most want the good life enjoyed in the developed countries.
Global ideological struggle exacerbates instability. Popular expectations for a better life is high, and in Africa, national unity has
not as yet been adequately forged. These factors contribute to
make African political life unstable. 3
When viewed in proper perspective the history of development
in the West does not support the notion of giving a prominent
place to the full realization of civil and political rights in Africa."
On the contrary, the Western experience argues for priority to
limited civil and political rights.

60. Id.
61. Haile, supra note 51, at 599-600.
62. Id. at 597.
63. Another discrepancy is that only after the West was fully industrialized
did the "politics of national welfare" come through universal sufferage. ORGANSKI, supra note 58, at, 12-13.
64. Haile, supra note 51, at 598-601.

1986]

HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA

III.

IMPLICATIONS FOR AFRICANS OF ASSIGNING PRIORITY TO

ECONOMIC RIGHTS: THE PROBLEMS OF DEVELOPMENT IN THE
ABSENCE OF CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS

Giving priority to economic rights in the implementation of
human rights and delaying the realization of other components of
human rights, particularly civil and political rights, has serious
implications for the people of Africa. One concern involves the
possibility that giving priority to economic rights will not lead to
economic development capable of meeting the basic needs of the
poor. The status of civil and political rights and personal security
rights in those African countries whose regimes have declared unequivocally their commitment to seeking economic development
first and have played down the importance of mechanisms that
afford the poor some opportunity to influence public policy forms
a second line of inquiry. The extent to which external assistance
can help meet the basic needs of Africans in the absence of civil
and political rights is a third issue. This section explores these
concerns.
A.

The Problem

The economic situation in most African countries is deteriorat-

ing.65 Fifteen African countries recorded a negative rate of per

capita growth between 1960 and 1979. In 19 other countries, per
capita income grew by less than one percent per year in the same

period.66 Output per person rose less in Africa than in any other

part of the world. Moreover, the rate of increase in Africa was
7

slower in the 1970s than in the 1960s.1
The economic crisis in Africa is most evident in agriculture. 68
Per capita food production has been declining. Total food production rose by 1.5% per year in the 1970s, compared with the 1960s'
rate of two percent.6 9 This meager growth in total food production has lagged behind increases in population, which in the 1970s

65.

ACCELERATED DEvELopMENT,

66.

Id.

supra note 2, at 2.

67. Id. at 3.
68. Because agriculture is "at the heart of African economies," the World
Bank observed that "its (agriculture's) sluggish record of recent years is the
principal factor underlying the poor economic performance of the countries" of
the African region. Id. at 45.
69. Id. at 3.
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averaged 2.7% per year.70 Because seventy to ninety percent of
the people in Africa earn their income from agriculture, the drop
in food production has meant a loss of real income for the poor in
Africa. 1
African imports of food grains have been growing at the rate of
nine percent per year since the 1960s 7 2 which makes African
countries increasingly dependent on food from abroad and
reduces further the prospect of self-sufficiency. The rate of
growth in imports of food grains has been more than three times
that at which population has increased. 73 As Africa's food imports
have increased, its share of the world market in export food production has been shrinking. The modest rate of increase of 1.9%
per year in the 1960s was countered by an equivalent decrease in
the 1970s.74
As a consequence of these economic trends, the incomes of the
African people have remained low 7 5 and access to basic services is
very limited. Death rates in Africa are the highest in the world
and life expectancy is the lowest.7 6 Fifteen to twenty percent of
African children die in their first year of life. Only twenty-five
percent of Africans have access to safe water.7 7 The reach of formal education is limited as well. 8
B.

Causes of the Crisis in African Agriculture

While the causes for the general failure of economic development in Africa are many, 79 the failure to achieve adequate growth
in agricultural production is attributable largely to the misguided
economic policies many African governments have followed. Although the overwhelming majority of the people in Africa live in
rural areas and earn their living from the land, the political leaders of Africa tend to adopt and implement economic policies that
either ignore or actually harm the interest of the rural masses.
70. Id.

71. Id.
72. Id. at 48.
73. Id. at 45.

74.
75.
Id.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 46.
Id. at 3. Per capita income in 1979 was $329 per year (excluding Nigeria).
Life expectancy in Africa is 47 years. Id.
Id.
Id. at 10.
See supra note 3.
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These economic policies have created disincentives which discourage farmers from increasing their output.8 0
Fixing the price of agricultural products at very low levels creates economic disincentives. In most African countries, the government controls producer and consumer prices for foodstuffs
with the purported aims of creating incentives for the farmers to
produce and guaranteeing food at reasonable prices to the urban
population.81 Because African governments' dominant motive has
generally been to pander to the politically conscious urban population, official food prices have been set at levels too low to encourage farmers to produce.8 2 Furthermore, African governments
have subsidized urban dwellers and discouraged agricultural production by selling imported food below cost 83 and increasing food
84
imports when domestic food prices rise.
The efforts of African governments to maintain overvalued exchange rates have curtailed incentives for farmers to produce
more. Farmers' earnings from the production of export crops decline because the local currency they receive does not have
purchasing power commensurate with the foreign exchange value
of their crops. The overvaluation of local currency also means
that the price of imported food is reduced.85
African governments' heavy taxation of export crop production86 is a third disincentive. This "high level of taxation of export crops through export taxes, marketing broad levies, excessive
marketing costs, and overvalued exchange rates have kept export
production in many countries below what it could have
been. . . ,,s Because African countries have comparative advan-

tages in the production of many of their traditional export crops,
these policies have led to "a loss of growth opportunities for the
80. "It is now widely agreed that insufficient price incentives for agricultural

producers are an important factor behind the disappointing growth of African
agriculture."

ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT,

supra note 2, at 55.

81. Id. at 56-57.
82. "[P]rices in parallel markets are often two or three times as high ....
[T]he policy of setting low official producer prices undoubtedly has negative effects on farmer incentives to produce and to sell basic foods." Id. at 57.

83. Id. at 56.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
Id. at 56.
Id. at 55.
Id.
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economy as a whole."8 8

In addition, African governments have not designed other important economic policies to benefit the rural poor. Many African
countries have "directed a substantial proportion of their agricultural investment to large-scale, government-operated estates
which involved heavy capital outlays for mechanization (as with
the rainfed crops) or irrigation schemes, or both." 89 Although crop
yields in Africa are generally markedly lower than in other continents, and are stagnant or falling,90 African governments have
failed to encourage research to increase yields.
C. Explanation of the Causes for the Failure to Raise
Agricultural Production
The international community has been preoccupied with designing and redesigning strategies for attaining economic development in the Third World. Development strategies that have emphasized growth, employment, growth with equity, the BNS, and
Action for Rural Development, fall within this tradition. All of
these strategies are based on the assumption that the political
leaders of the developing countries are willing and able to work in
the interest of their respective peoples once the appropriate strategy has been revealed to them and the necessary resources have
been made available. Despite the failure of these strategies for
development to produce satisfactory economic progress for the
African masses, doubts are rarely expressed about the validity of
the assumptions that underlie these strategies. Specifically, the
international community has carefully scrutinized neither the
possibility that the ruling elites in most African countries may be
unwilling to take into account the interests of their rural majorities, nor the possibility that the political structure of most African states may preclude them from taking those interests into account. The United Nations and its Specialized Agencies, like the
World Bank, will not undertake this kind of inquiry because their
membership includes Third World countries whose internal legitimacy would be called into question. Third World governments
cannot be expected to raise these issues where their own political
foundations are undemocratic.
88.

Id. at 56.

89. Id. at 51.
90.

Id. at 69.
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Some commentators in the academic world are concerned with
questions of the relation of civil and political rights to economic
development. Because countries like China appear to have
achieved a measure of economic development in the absence of
civil and political rights, confusion exists regarding the relevance
of civil and political rights to economic development. The tendency of academics to focus on the economic aspects of development and to treat the political aspects as matters of marginal relevance has been strengthened.
In the African context adequate economic develop ment in general and improvement of agrarian production in particular cannot
be achieved without the implementation of certain civil and political rights. More specifically, consideration must be given to the
rights of freedom of speech91 and of assembly92 and to the rights
provided for in Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights:
Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives .

.

. the will

of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this
will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which
shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret
vote or by equivalent free voting proceduresY 3
These civil and political rights provide the only practical mechanism available to the people of Africa to force their political
leaders both to respond to their economic needs and to abandon
the economic policies that are hindering progress. Both the BNS,
which emphasizes the material component of the African peoples'
basic needs, and the Action for Rural Development, which is
based on the hope that African governments will divert the bulk
of their investments to the agrarian sector, have the technical potential to succeed. Neither is likely to produce the desired results,
however, if the role of civil and political rights in economic development continues to be ignored.
An examination of the economic strategies that have been pursued in the past demonstrates that the strategies floundered not
because they were incapable of serving the interests of the rural
91.

.

See The Universal Declaration on Human Rights, art. 19, reprinted in

BROWNLE, BASIC DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

147 (1972).

92. Id., art. 20, reprinted at 148.
93. Id., art. 21, reprintedat 148. See also infra Section IV-C for the benefits
of popular participation at the local level.
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poor, but because they were not permitted to serve that interest
in practice. These failures are also attributable in part to the denial to the rural majority in Africa of the civil and political rights
by which they might have influenced their governments to implement programs and take actions that would meet their basic
needs.
The economic growth or trickle-down strategy added to the
wealth, prestige, luxury, and political power of the privileged few
in most African societies. Those who reaped the benefits of this
policy seemed to care little that the majority of the population
suffered from unemployment and the absence of social services
and sank deeper into poverty. The poor had no real political influence and, consequently, could not enforce their preferences
upon the ruling elites. 4
The majority's lack of political influence explains the failure of
a policy that emphasized economic growth to improve the lot of
the poor in Africa. Governments responsive to the needs of the
disadvantaged could have taken steps, through taxes and basic
social programs, to achieve a more even distribution of the fruits
of the growth that did occur, even if market conditions did not
assure an adequate rate of "trickle-down" in the short run. This
did not happen, however. The reorientation of the policies that
brought economic benefits and power to the elite would have required a voluntary repudiation of self-interest which the elites of
Africa were unwilling to support.
As development strategies moved away from the simple emphasis on economic growth and began to stress the importance of
meeting more directly the needs of the poor, the adverse implications of those strategies for the interests of the elites increased.
As a result, the prospect that African governments would fully
implement those strategies when the majority lacked civil and political rights declined. The influence the elites exerted and the interest of African governments in retaining power produced several
negative consequences. First, these governments were unlikely to
allocate their budgetary resources for the development of rural
areas. The African governments were unwilling to pursue policies
to ensure that the poor could feed themselves, that the health of
the rural poor was cared for through the establishment of medical
facilities, or that the educational needs of the rural masses were
94. See Trubek, supra note 28, at 228-29.
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met. Second, the ruling elites did not reorient production from
non-essential goods that the wealthy desired to the simple consumer goods the poor needed.9 5 Third, government policies did
not change pricing and foreign exchange practices to aid farmers
in receiving a fair return for their products or free farmers from
the forced subsidization of consumption in urban areas. Last, African governments failed to provide increased employment opportunities through support of labor intensive technologies, rather
than through the increased mechanization of agricultural
production.
To assess the possibility of African governments' success in giving priority to economic rights or of meeting the basic needs of
the poor in the absence of civil and political rights, the preceding
implications of the BNS must be considered. Because these requirements of the BNS mean a more even distribution of existing
wealth and of the benefits accruing from economic growth, undemocratic regimes are not likely to adopt this strategy. Further,
a danger exists that some African leaders may cite the emphasis
international agencies are placing on the BNS to reinforce their
existing tendency to disregard the civil and political rights and
the personal security rights of the people they govern.
With respect to the agricultural crisis in Africa, the FAO Regional Food Plan for Africa" suggests a major action program for
rural development that would lead to a tripling of the growth rate
in agricultural production. The program calls for investment of
$125 billion for the fifteen year period from 1975 to 1990. Similarly, the World Bank's Agenda for Action for Rural Development
emphasizes the need of policies that would involve "a focus on
small holder production; changing incentive structures (by hiking
producer prices, developing more open and competitive marketing
arrangements, and involving farmers in the decisions that affect
them) . . . undertaking quick-yielding activities in irrigated
'9 7

agriculture.
These proposals to reverse the deterioration of agricultural production in Africa obviously would require fundamental changes in
the policies the leaders of African countries are pursuing. Those
who have prescribed these antidotes to agricultural decline, however, have paid almost no attention to whether African political
95. See

SANDBROOK, supra note 24, at 11-12.
DEVELOPMENT, supra note

96. See ACCELERATED
97. Id. at 50.

2, at 49-50.
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leaders will implement these policies in good faith.
To meet the crisis in African agriculture African governments
must reverse their present policies. They must provide greater incentives for agricultural production, eliminate the bias against the
rural sector, raise the prices at which governments purchase from
the farmers, devalue currencies to reflect reality in purchasing
power, and implement a tax structure that promotes, rather than
depresses, production of export crops. In the long run, agricultural production will benefit from the expansion of research, soil
conservation and greater attention to aiding small landholders in
improving production. 8
Whether the political leaders of Africa will adopt these reformist plans will depend less on the technical merits of the plans
than on short term political considerations. To the extent that
the recommended policies imply adverse results for the politicized
urban population, African leaders will not be willing to implement those policies unless the leaders operate in political structures which make them responsive to the demands of the rural
areas. In systems in which the rural masses have no meaningful
civil and political rights, the likelihood that the political leaders
of Africa will reverse their existing agricultural policies by adopting new strategies is slight.
The magnitude of the domestic resources required to meet the
basic material needs of the poor and the egalitarianism inherent
in this type of program suggest that the BNS can emanate only
from a democratic regime or from a political leadership committed to self-abnegation. Politicians pursue power and, having acquired it, generally give top priority to maintaining it. This universal phenomenon is incompatible with the basic needs strategy.
Even if one assumes that the ruling elites in Africa are genuinely committed to giving priority to economic rights in order to
meet the material needs of the poor, serious questions exist about
whether they have the political freedom to take the necessary actions. The political structure of most African states is based on
informal coalitions primarily involving those who live in urban areas.99 In those countries political pressures such as labor strikes,
student demonstrations, and threats of military take-over come
essentially from the modernized, politically conscious, urbanized
98.

Id. at ch. 5.

99.

BRuN-OTTo BRYDE, THE POLrrIcs AND SOCIOLOGY OF AFRICAN LEGAL DE-

VELOPMENT

35-59 (1976).
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segments of society. An African government has a greater chance
to remain in power for a longer time if it acts to satisfy the expectations of these politicized elements. The rural areas, populated
largely by poor farmers, pose no serious threat to the government.
For this reason, African governments tend to ignore with impunity the interests of the rural poor. 100 If the political structure of
these African governments remains untouched, the chances are
slight that any government's verbal commitment will result in its
meeting the basic material needs of the rural poor.10 1
Another problem is that the absence of mechanisms through
which the poor can exert some political influence results in an
absence of mechanisms by which the poor can correct ill-conceived and injurious development policies of their governments.
For example, Tanzania became an importer of maize after the
government, as part of its program of "Ujamaa," lowered the
price of maize and expropriated the lands of thirty-five large-scale
farmers who produced thirty percent of the maize.1°2 Debate over
Ujamaa was disallowed, and therefore the potential negative consequences of that action were never aired. 03 In Kenya, President
Kenyatta's order that businessmen increase their employees by
ten percent ultimately had undesirable consequences. 0 4 In
Ghana, the market run by women in Accra was destroyed and no
substitute administrative, transport or distribution facilities were
05
created.1
The efficacy of the New International Economic Order (NIEO)
in meeting basic needs within a reasonable time is doubtful in the
absence of civil and political rights. The United Nations General
Assembly in its Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order' 0 6 and its elaboration of the Declaration
in the Programs of Action 107 has set forth the basic principles and

100. Id.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

See Alston, supra note 30, at 55.
See Howard, supra note 48, at 471-72.
Id. at 472.
Id.
Id. at 473.

106. Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, May 1, 1974, G.A. Res. S-3201, 6 (Special) U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 1) at 3,
U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974), reprintedin BASIC DocuMsENTS ININTERNATIONAL LAW
AND WORLD ORDER 273 (Weston, Falk & D'Amato eds. 1980).

107. Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, May 1, 1974, G.A. Res. S-3202, 6 (Special) U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
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programs of NIEO. The premise of the NIEO is that the international economic order should be changed to make available to the
developing countries more resources with which they can achieve
more rapid economic development. 108 This approach recognizes
both that the developing countries themselves do not have adequate resources to meet their immense needs and that the current
poverty of the Third World is in part due to the inequitable international economic relationship between rich and poor countries. Thus, the programs of action seek to strengthen the export
earnings of the Third World, 1°0 to transfer resources to the Third
World through development assistance and international financial
institutions, 11 0 to provide greater access to markets in the developed countries through the removal of tariffs and other barriers,"' and to give the developing countries a greater voice in international financial institutions through reforms in voting
procedures. 1
Doubt remains, however, about whether the governments of
many Third World countries would be willing or able to meet the
basic needs of the poorer segments of their societies, even with
the commitment of developed countries to implement the NIEO.
The benefits of the NIEO might go to the elites of the Third
World, rather than to the poor. 1 3 Unless the political order in
many developing countries is restructured to give meaningful political influence to the poor, neither African leaders nor the leaders of other Third World countries are likely to use the resources
made available by the NIEO to meet the basic needs of the poor.
Thus, the main causes for the continued economic misery and
poverty of the peoples of Africa can be traced to the deliberate

1) at 5, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974), reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS IN INTERNA276 (Weston, Falk & D'Amato eds. 1980) [hereinafter Programme of Action].
108. See Trubek, supra note 28, at 247-48.
109. See Programme of Action, supra note 107, art. I, § 1, reprinted at 27677.
110. Id., art. II, reprinted at 279-80.
111. Id., art. I, § 3, reprinted at 278.
112. Id., art. II, § 2, reprinted at 280.
113. See Galtung, The New International Economic Order and the Basic

TIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER

Needs Approaches: Compatibility, Contradictionand/or Conflict?, 9

ANNALS OF

129-31 (1978). See also Donnelly, The Right to Development:
How Not to Link Human Rights and Development, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 261, 274-75 (C. Welch & R. Meltzer eds. 1984).
INT'L STUDIES
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economic policies of the political leaders of African states. The
explanations for these injurious economic policies lie primarily in
the political structures of those regimes. Those regimes afford no
civil or political rights to the mass of their people. As a result, the
leaders of these countries gain by pursuing policies that do not
benefit the rural poor.
Development strategies which fail to deal with these root causes
of poverty are unlikely to succeed. This situation will persist as
long as African political leaders vociferously affirm their commitment to giving priority to economic rights but decline to broaden
their political base through the recognition and implementation
of civil and political rights for their people. Accordingly, the pretense of giving priority to economic rights may serve only to perpetuate the misery of the African populace. The establishment of
a durable democratic system in Africa and the potential of that
system to meet the basic needs of the people remain problematic.
IV. THE

DILEMMA AND SOLUTIONS

Previous analysis raises two conflicting propositions. First, economic development requires the recognition and practice of civil
and political rights. Second, adequate civil and political rights
cannot be established in Africa with its current political structure. More specifically, a major obstacle to economic development
is the political dynamic of most African states, a dynamic that
makes political leaders dependent on the modernized and
politicized sector of the population. This dependence impedes
those leaders from making efforts to meet the material needs of
the poor. Ineradicable obstacles, however, may frustrate the task
of reforming authoritarian political structures along democratic
lines. These obstacles include lack of Aational cohesion, expectations for improved living conditions, and destabilizing effects of
the global ideological struggle.
A. Revolution
The ideological status that Afro-Marxist states give to civil

114 Civil
rights is ostensibly similar to that of the Soviet Union.

rights such as freedom of speech, press and assembly are exer114. See Gastil, supra note 44, at 16-17, Table 1. See also Country Report,
supra note 1.
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cised only "'in order to strengthen the socialist system' "115 or to
support the policies and programs of the leaders. 11 6 This view of
civil rights involves outright rejection of the fundamental values
of the right to speak, to write and to assemble for the purpose of
criticizing the government in power.117 No purpose is served in
characterizing as a "right" that which is understood to apply only
when one manifests agreement with. those in power.
Afro-Marxist states also reject the concept of political rights
which include the right to elect political leaders.11 s In those countries, all parties except the communist party or its Africanized
analog are illegal. Criticism of the government's programs and
policies is prohibited. Elections, based on democratic centralism
and frequently requiring mass political participation, become instruments for endorsing the policies of the political leaders, not
means for selecting or controlling those leaders." 9
Furthermore, evidence suggests that the denial of civil and political rights by these regimes is not merely a temporary phenomenon. The experience of the Soviet Union and the other communist countries demonstrates that the restrictions they place on the
exercise of civil and political rights is likely to last until the leadership decides that prevailing conditions permit the withering
away of the state. In the meantime Africa will remain without any
effective means of controlling its self-appointed leaders.
The policy of the dictators of the right with respect to civil and
political rights, though perhaps not as clearly enunciated, is
equally inimical to democratic values. The only hopeful sign is
that those dictatorships have proven more vulnerable to revolu-

115. DRAGNICH & RASMUSSEN, MAJOR EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS 474 (1978).
See also L. HENKIN, THE RIGHTS OF MAN TODAY 69 (1978).
116. Accord DRAGNICH & RASMUSSEN, supra note 115, at 474.

117. See id.
118. Article 25 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that
every citizen shall have the right:
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely
chosen representatives;
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be
by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Iights, Mar. 23, 1976, G.A. Res.
2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967), reprinted
in BASic DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 201, 207 (Wes-

ton, Falk & D'Amato eds. 1980).
119.

DRAGNICH

& RASMUSSEN, supra note 115, at 442.
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tionary change than the dictatorships of the left. One possible approach that some African elites endorse is revolution. For instance, several Marxist leaders assert that the continued
underdevelopment of Third World societies is a result of the use
of economic surplus, "that which remains after necessary consumption has been subtracted from total output," 120 by aristocratic landlords and the emerging middle class for wasteful luxury
consumption. These Marxists state that this surplus should fund
continued expansion, modernization of business and programs to
meet the basic needs of the people. 121 The Marxists contend the
present capitalist structure prevents the development process
from proceeding. Thus, these leaders propose a revolution to replace the capitalist structure with socialist society under the control of workers and peasants as an interim step in the development process. 122 The validity of the Marxists' proposal hinges
largely on who the socialist leaders will be, whether they will be
committed to self-abnegation, and the extent to which they will
be committed to act in the interests of the workers and peasants.
Remedies of this sort cannot ameliorate the problems emanating from the political structure of most African states. Rather,
they inipede genuine efforts to improve the lot of the poor and
worsen the structural problems because they narrow the government's political base. Totalitarian regimes often eliminate existing political structures through which certain politicized elements of the population have been able to exercise some
pragmatic influence on government. The few who hold political
power rule without fear that adverse consequences will result
from their policies or actions.
Some leaders who hold power in this fashion may miraculously
be "philosopher-kings." In that event, they might pursue policies
designed to meet the needs of their people, albeit at a high cost in
terms of suppression of civil and political rights. But if, as has
been the case almost universally, these leaders deviate from altruism by enhancing their more immediate political power or their
own economic interests, the people will suffer silently because no
legal means will exist by which they can challenge either the rulers or their policies. The record of the Afro-Marxist states, in
terms of economic growth, are no better than the record of the

120. Wilber & Jameson, supra note 19, at 19.
121. Id. at 23-24.
122. Id. at 26-27.
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pragmatic authoritarian states of Africa. 123 In the area of economic equality, no clear evidence exists that the Afro-Marxist
1 4
states have performed better than other African countries.
Thus, the extreme priority Afro-Marxist states have given to
economic rights has not resulted in either better economic
growth 125 or in a successful effort to meet the material needs of
the poor. Even if the Afro-Marxist states had succeeded in their
economic efforts, the larger question of the desirability of having
societies in which the people's basic material needs have been
met, but in which the members of that society have lost their civil
and political rights, remains. The failure of these regimes to attain their economic or distributional goals makes their denial of
civil and political rights intolerable.
B.

Supporting Pragmatic Authoritarian Regimes

A second strategy is the establishment or support of pragmatic
authoritarian governments which formally recognize or which informally tolerate some exercise of civil and political rights. While
full recognition of civil and political rights are ideal conditions for
the achievement of the economic rights of all the people of Africa,
it is impractical at present. Accepting the homily that "half a loaf
is better than none," this approach supports regimes that observe
some civil and political rights as representing a lesser evil than
the human rights practices and philosophy of the Afro-Marxist
and right-wing totalitarian regimes. This approach distinguishes
between African governments on the basis of the extent to which
they presently recognize civil, political and personal security
rights and the prospects for increased observance of these rights
in the future. Therefore, extreme forms of dictatorships in Africa,
on both the right and the left, would be grouped together from
the point of view of observance of human rights.
In contrast to Afro-Marxist regimes, most pragmatic authoritarian African governments do not deny all meaningful civil and
political rights in principle or in practice. These rights are allowed to exist, albeit in varying and generally inadequate degrees. 12' The prospect that existing restrictions on civil and politi123. See C. YOUNG,
124. Id. at 305.
125.

IDEOLOGY AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

96 (1982).

Id. at 298.

126. See Gastil, supra note 44, at 16-17 (Table 1). See also Country Report,
supra note 1, for freedoms in various African countries.
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cal rights will gradually be removed, however, is much better than
in the Afro-Marxist states 127 and other totalitarian regimes.
C.

Participation

Although the political rights emphasized relate to the rights of
all citizens to take part in the governments of their countries, either directly or through chosen representatives, other types of
participation in the governing process could be important in helping to facilitate the development of policies and programs that
will meet the basic needs of the poor. For example, opportunities
should be provided for participation at the local level in decisions
concerning the allocation of resources that the central government makes available for economic development. 12s This participation may prevent bureaucratic mismanagement of those resources. Although this type of participation may not materially
influence the quantity or the quality of the resources apportioned
to rural areas in the short term, it has the long-run potential to
improve the efficiency with which those resources are used.
Participation in local decision-making is likely to counter extreme economic centralization and its potential to stifle initiative.
China, which has a tradition of supporting public participation in
local decision-making, is endeavoring presently to extricate itself
from unduly centralized economic policymaking. In Africa, those
authoritarian rulers whose efforts to develop the rural areas have
been stymied by urban opposition may find that public participation in local economic decision-making and the organization of local government will place them in a stronger position to resist the
demands of their urban populations.
D. Nationalization
Nationalization of land, banks, and industry is an important
process for many African states. However, before one rejoices that
the government has taken the means of production out of the
hands of private owners, one should inquire into the identity of
the new owner: "When -the government owns the means of pro-

127. J. Kirkpatric, Dictatorshipsand Double Standards,Reprint No. 107, in
COMMENTARY, Nov. 1979, at 44.

128. Dias & Paul, Developing the Human Rights to Food as a Legal Resource for the Rural Poor: Some Strategies for NGOs, in THE RIGHT TO FOOD
203 (P. Alston & K. Tomasevski eds. 1984).
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duction, the question is who owns the government."'12 9
If the government is not based broadly on the consent of the
governed, then putting the means of production in its hands
amounts to no more than giving it to the few rulers who constitute the government. African societies will fare no better merely
because the control of the means of production changes from private landlords and capitalists to ruling groups who are accountable to no one. For example, when a government nationalizes, the
new owner of the soil will eventually benefit if the resources the
government controls are used for development purposes. If the
political rulers use those resources either to enrich themselves or
to perpetuate themselves in office, however, by purchasing arms,
increasing the size of the standing army or the police, or establishing an extensive internal security apparatus, no reason exists
to applaud "nationalization." Similarly, if the process of nationalization of the means of production is largely ideological, the public may suffer when sufficient consideration is not given to
whether the officials who will administer the nationalized property are adequately trained, will perform efficiently, and are motivated to act in the public interest.1 30
V.

CONCLUSION

In the absence of civil and political rights, the prospects are
slim that economic development which meets the basic needs of
the poor will occur in Africa. Because African political leaders are
forced by self-interest and political circumstance to respond to
political pressures affecting their tenure of power, they are likely
to continue to ignore the needs of the poor, particularly those of
the rural poor. In addition, most economic development strategies, including growth, growth with equity, the BNS and the
NIEO, are likely to remain largely meaningless for the suffering
poor of Africa. 3 '

129.

SANDBROOK, supra note 24, at 103.

130. In addition to those practical problems, extreme forms of economic centralization or collectivization may in itself endanger civil, political and personal
security rights. See generally, HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944).
"[T]he root cause of hunger is the increasing concentration of control
. . . No
new combination of material inputs . . . can address the powerlessness of the
poor that is at the root of hunger." LAPPE, COLLINS & KINLEY, Am As OBSTACLE:
131.

over food-producing resources in the hands of fewer and fewer people.
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Serious internal obstacles also block adequate realization of
civil and political rights in Africa. The colonial legacy, rising popular expectations for a better life, subversion from abroad and the
absence of strong national cohesion will engender political instability in African political systems that give free rein to the exercise of civil and political rights. Moreover, even if one assumes a
democratic political system would be viable politically, that system may succumb to demands for ince-ased consumption rather
than promote adequate investment in infrastructure. In either
event, democratic political systems will tend to be unstable, with
the result that economic development will not be achieved and
civil and political rights will not adequately be observed.
Thus, according some absolute priority to either economic
rights or civil and political rights is not a desirable objective in
Africa. The former is likely to remain an empty promise, while
the latter, even if viable, may not lead to economic progress. The
paradoxical nature of this conclusion compels a view of the problem from the following perspective.
First, -although both sets of rights are important, civil and political rights are the means by which economic rights can be enforced in the African context. Although full observance of civil
and political rights is not practicable at present, no alternative
exists to making a distinction among African regimes based both
on the degree to which they violate these rights and the prospects
that violations will diminish. In broad terms, the distinction: suggested is between those totalitarian regimes of the right and left
which do not give meaningful recognition to civil and political
rights and those pragmatic authoritarian regimes in Africa which
accept civil and political rights but do not observe them
adequately.
Neither revolution nor economic centralization are strategies
likely to resolve constructively the development and rights dilemmas currently facing most of Africa. One step toward overcoming
some of the problems inherent in the "rights paradox" is to encourage rural people to participate in the formation and execution of projects of. their localities. This participation may lead
eventually to their participation in the formation of local and national governments.

